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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European
Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law at the International Hellenic
University. This thesis introduces European State aid Law and its impact in the Energy
Sector,  emphasizing  on  State  aid  cases  within  the  German  and  the  Greek  Energy
Market. The main purpose of the dissertation is to convince that even when State aid is
characterized as unlawful and prohibited under primary law at a first glance, looking at
its  effects  more deeply,  it  might  be finally declared  as compatible  with the internal
market  because  of  its  favorable  effects!  State  aid  granted  in  the  energy sector,  can
undeniably have a positive effect on environmental protection, climate change, energy
sustainability,  but it  can also  aim  to strengthen and ensure the competitiveness of
industries, being granted in the form of reductions for intensive electricity users.  
Initially,  a  brief  analysis  of  the  fundamental  provision  Article  107 TFEU is
given. Then the novel Environmental and Energy State aid Guidelines 2014-2020 are
introduced, explaining in which way they support achieving the targets of the “Europe
2020 Strategy” and which are the innovative support schemes for the Energy Markets
that are introduced for the first time. Emphasize is given on State aid cases within the
German and the Greek Energy Sector which have concerned the European Commission
and the European Courts until today. The analysis of the German EEG-Act Cases and
the Greek Aluminium Cases,  has the purpose to adhere on the way State aid law is
applied  in  practice  and  how  the  Commission  accomplishes  examination  of  the
lawfulness and the compatibility within the internal market of State aid in the energy
sector. 
Keywords:  State  aid,  Europe  2020  Strategy,  Environmental  and  Energy  State  aid
Guidelines 2014-2020, German Energy Market, Greek Energy Market    
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INTRODUCTION
The EU internal  energy market  is  essential, both to  ensure  secure energy at
affordable  prices  and  to  fight  climate  change.  In  some  very  specific  cases  public
intervention  in  the  form  of  subsidies  might  be  necessary  to  attain  public  policy
objectives. These subsidies have to be granted under very strict conditions, in order to
secure  that  they  will  not  be  assessed  as  State  aid  which  causes  distortions  in  the
competition and which is incompatible  with the internal  market1.  In 2012, State  aid
statistics were published which concluded that the most subsidized horizontal objectives
were environmental  protection,  including  energy saving,  which  received  EUR. 14.4
billion of aid. It is obvious that nowadays governments are increasingly paying attention
to the  harm environmental  protection  from environmental  degradation  and the  risks
from dependency on imported fossil fuels such oil and gas2.
In order to accept State aid measures as compatible with the internal market,
European  Primary  and  Secondary  Legislation  has  to  be  applied.  Additionally,  the
European  Commission  has  to  assess  the  lawfulness  of  State  aid  for  environmental
protection and energy under the new Guidelines 2014-2020. State aid which distorts
competition has to be considered as unlawful and therefore it is prohibited. But coming
to the support schemes which are usually used by Member States for the energy markets
it is not so clear what finally can be considered as unlawful aid! This happens because
in many cases a State aid might be unlawful at a first glance but looking at its effects
more deeply it  might  be compatible  because of its  positive  effect  on environmental
protection,  climate  change  and  energy  sustainability.“The  Europe  2020  Strategy”
triggers additionally urges the Member States to intervene by granting support schemes
to the Energy Sector in order to reach the desideratum. Binding targets for the climate
change  and  the  energy  sustainability  have  been  implemented  by  “The  climate  and
energy package”3, but also a “A policy Framework for climate and energy in the period
from 2020 to 2030 ” was set by the European Commission in order to clarify which
1 IP/13/1021 Commission, Press Release. Brussels,5 November 2013  EU. Commission: Guidance for
state intervention in  electricity.
2 Ph. Nicolaides, State aid Uncoverd, Critical Analysis of Developements in State aid, Lexxion 2014, pp.
256
3 Decision No 406/2009/EC of April 2009 (OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, pp.136) and Directive 2009/28/EC of
April 2009 (OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, pp. 16)
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energy and climate objectives are to be met by the Member States until 2030  4.  The
Commission  has  set  the  target  of  adopting  a   Best  Practices  Code  and  Simplified
Procedure to accelerate State aid decisions 5, 6.
How did State intervention in the form of State aid measures affect the Greek
and  the  German  Energy Market  until  today?  Was  it  in  a  positive  and  fair  manner
exclusively? Or did some support schemes eventually  frustrate the markets? How do
the act of the State Aid modernization (SAM) and the Guidelines 2014-2020 influence
the Greek and the German  Energy market ? 
4 (2014/C 200/01) Energy and Environmental State aid Guidelines 2014-2020 (EEAG), Introduction (4)
5 European Commission MEMO/09/208, Brussels, 29th April 2009.
6 In the context of a modernized system of State aid rules, to contribute both to the implementation of the
Europe 2020 strategy for  growth  and to  budgetary  consolidation,the Procedural  Regulation  (EC) No
659/1999 which layed down detailed rules for the procedure of State aid was recently amended by the
Regulation  2015/1589, of 13 July 2015 which lays down detailed rules for the application of Article 108
TFEU. This new Procedural Regulation targets on the one hand to reach  maximum of transparency and
legal predictability and on the other hand to accelerate the procedure for the State aid measures which do
not fall under the exceptions (GBER and De minimis) and have therefore to be notified by the Member
States to the Commission.
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CHAPTER 1
The legal foundation of State aid in the European Energy Sector
1. The fundamental provision of the Treaty 
The integral base of the State aid can be found in the primary European Law
under Article 107 TFEU. This Article is the pillar of the State aid as it prohibits the
granting of State aid by Member States when this ultimately has the effect of distortion
of competition in the European markets. But does this Article categorically disqualify
and preclude any granting of State aid in general? Article 107 TFEU “is based on the
objective to reduce State aid, and in particular to distinguish between 'good' State aid
justified by environmental disaster, social,  and economic disparity reasons, and 'bad'
State  aid,  which  distorts  competition  and  EU  trade  without  having  any  redeeming
virtues”7.  In  this  sense  the  European  Commission,  which  has  the  “Examination
Monopoly”, has to decide first if the granted aid falls under article 107(1) TFEU and
therefore if  it  constitutes  prohibited unlawful State aid8.  But the second step for the
Commission is to examine if that prohibited State aid falls under any of the exceptions,
under Secondary law9 or under Article 107 (2) and (3) TFEU, in order to finally justify
7 K. Talus, EU Energy Law and policy. A critical Account.(Oxford University Press, 1st Edition, 
2013).pp.139
8 Article 108 (3) TFEU requires that the Commission is informed of any plans to grant or alter aid; thus
the starting point is that any aid which meets the description set down in the Article 107(1) TFEU must be
notified to the Commission. Aid approved by way of block exemption (including the GBER), the EEAG
and the he De minimis aid is  deemed not to meet  the Article  107(1) conditions and the notification
requirement  does not  apply.  The Commission has  a  period of  two months after  notification to  raise
objections. The Commission has the right to proceed to the formal investigation procedure under Article
108(2)TFEU and therefore to exceed the time period of the two months. During the above procedure the
Member State is bound by the Stand Still obligation and therefore granting of the aid is forbidden. Where
the Commission adopts a negative decision in respect of unlawful aid it is required in principle to order
recovery of  the aid from the beneficiary,  together  with interest.  The Commission’s decision may be
challenged  before  the  General  Court,  with  appeal  lying  to  the  Court  of  Justice.{J.  Maurici  QC,  H.
Sargent,  “State  aid  in  planning  and  compulsory  purchase  order  cases”,  Journal  of  Planning  &
Environment Law 2015,West Law}It is remarkable that despite the notification obligation it happens very
often that the European Commission considers a State aid measure finally as lawful, despite the fact that
it was granted before the notification {C(2013) 6702 final, State aid. SA.35164 (2013/NN) – Greece –
Compressor Station in Nea Messimvria, Par. 77}.
9 The General Block Exemption Regulation 651/2014 ("GBER") focuses especially on Environmental and
Energy State aid. It is  worth to notice that the European Union has emphasized on this types of State Aid
during the act of the State Aid modernization (SAM). Therefore the revised version of the GBER, which
entered into force on 1 July 2014 covers all the categories of Article 107(3) (c)TFEU. Especially "aid for
environmental  protection"  which  fulfills  the  Articles  107(1)  criteria  is  exempted  from  the  prior
notification and approval procedure by the GBER."Environmental protection" is defined in the Article
2(101) GBER as: "any action designed to remedy or prevent damage to physical surroundings or natural
resources by a beneficiary’s own activities, to reduce risk of such damage or to lead to a more efficient
use of natural resources, including energy-saving measures and the use of renewable sources of energy."It
is remarkable that in particular for the Energy Sector the GBER includes very crucial provisions which
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an accept the State aid as compatible with the internal market10. In all respects, it is
crucial  to  make  clear  that  Article  107(1)  TFEU  does  not  distinguish  between  the
measures of State intervention concerned by reference to their legal nature, the causes
or  their  aims,  but  defines  them in  relation  to  their  effects11.  Article  107 (1)  TFEU
comprises four cumulative conditions 12. These four conditions have been detailed and
clarified many times by the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European
Union (hereinafter “CJEU”) and the General Court (GC) until today. 
State aid under Article 107 (1) TFEU is present where:
-Aid is  Granted by the State  or Trough State  Resources.  The text  of Article  107(1)
TFEU appears to suggest that the advantage must be either granted by the State (but  not
necessarily  involve  State  resources)  or  through  State  resources.  As  it  is  has  been
determined by the CJEU, in order for a measure to be considered as a State aid, it must
be granted to the undertaking through State resources or resources of any public law
entity (which constitute likewise State resources), directly or indirectly, and it must be
imputable  to  the  State.  In  any case,  it  seems that  in  order  for  this  condition  to  be
fulfilled, there has to be transfer of a resource from the State to the beneficiary 13. But
this transfer of sources is not always so clear! It is noteworthy that this criterion has
posed many questions in the last decades and has caused difficulties in several cases
which had to be surpassed by the European Commission and the CJEU. In the case of
establish  the  compatibility  of  investment  aid  for  several  very  important  and  innovative  energy
investments.  Article  40 GBER “investment aid for  high-efficiency cogeneration”.The Articles  41 -42
GBER disclose the goal  of   “the Europe 2020 Strategy”,  encouraging and promoting investments in
energy  and  operation  aid  for  electricity  from  Renewable  Energy  sources.  The  De  minimis  criteria
Regulation 1407/2013 entered into force on the 1 January 2014 and applies until the 31 December 2020.
Pursuant to Article 3 De minimis aid of up to €200,000  may be granted to a single undertaking over any
period of three fiscal years. Such aid is deemed not to meet all the criteria in the Article 107(1)  TFEU
and therefore it has to be considered as compatible with the internal market State aid .In addition to the
De minimis Regulation the Commission Regulation 360/2012 of April 25, 2012 applies, which addresses
the application of the Articles 107 and 108 TFEU to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing
"services of general economic interest" ("SGEI"). Pursuant to Article .2 of the de minimis aid Regulation
for SGEI aid up to €500,000 over any period of three fiscal years which is granted to a single undertaking
providing SGEI is deemed not to meet all the criteria  of the TFEU art.107(1) which means that it  is
considered  as  compatible.The  GBER  and  the  De  minimis  Regulation  have  achieved  decisive
simplification  of  the  State  aid  procedure  and  constitute  the  first  step  towards  the  objective  of  the
Commission to fasten the State aid control procedures.{European Commission MEMO/09/208, Brussels,
29th April 2009} 
10 H.  Schroeter,  T.  Jakob,  R.  Klots,W. Mederer,  Europaisches  Wettbewerbsrecht  (NomosKomentar,
zweite  Auflage,  2014).  A.  Kliemann  “Vorschriften  uber  staatliche  Beihilfen-Art.  107-109
AEUV”.pp.2033
11 C173/73, Italy v Commission,1974 .  
12 Faul and Nikpay. The  EU Law of competition. (Oxford University Press, 1st Edition, 2014).pp.192
13 IBID, see reference 7. pp.141
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PreussenElektra  it was held that the obligation imposed on private electricity supply
undertakings  to  purchase  electricity  produced  from renewable  electricity  sources  at
fixed minimum prices, Feed-in tariffs did not involve any direct or indirect transfer of
state resources to undertakings which produced that type of electricity14,  15. But it was
established in the  Essent case16 that  if the company on which the State imposed the
purchase obligation was instead State-owned this would mean that the resources used in
the PreussenElektra case would have been resources belonging to and controlled by a
fully State-owned company, and therefore the granting would be imputable to the State.
It has been established under the case law in the  Doux Elevage  case17 that it  is not
necessary,  in  order  to  find  under  107(1)  TFEU State  aid,  to  have  transfer  of  State
resources  for  the  advantage  granted  to  the  beneficiary.  Additionally,  it  has  been
repeatedly accepted under case law that  the resources can constitute  State resources
even if they are only under the control of the State18. Finally, it has been accepted in the
case of  Italy v Commission that even if the State aid measure was imposed by State
legislation and was managed and apportioned in accordance with the provisions of the
legislation, this implies the transfer of State resources even if they are administered by
institutions distinct from the public authorities 19.
-An economic  advantage  granted  to  the  beneficiary. The  word  “advantage”  is  not
directly mentioned in Article 107 (1) TFEU, but reference is made to it indirectly in the
form of   “any  aid...in  any  form”.  The  substantiation  of  the  “economic  advantage”
precondition can be fulfilled even with measures that do not directly grant a benefit but
14 C 379/98, PreussenElektra AG  v Schleswag AG, in the presence of Windpark Reuίenkφge III GmbH
and Land Schleswig-Holstein,  2001}.  par.57  and  58.The CJEU decided  that  the  distinction  made in
Article 107 (1) TFEU between 'aid granted by a Member State' and aid granted ' through State resources'
does not signify that all advantages granted by a State, whether financed through State resources or not,
constitute aid but is intended merely to bring within that definition both advantages which are granted
directly by the State and those granted by a public or private body designated or established by the State.
15 Opinion of Advocate General  Jacobs in Case C379/98 PreussenElektra,  delivered on 26 October
2000,par.114
16 C-206/06, Essent Netwerk Nord and Others,{2008}, par.66-69. In this case, the Belgian government
fined Essent  Belgium for  failure  to  comply with Belgian  legislation requiring electricity suppliers  to
purchase a certain amount of green energy from Belgian suppliers. Differently from the PreussenElektra
in this case the Court found that certain amounts under the scheme had their origin on a state resource and
this appeared to be so because the charge was imposed by law and the proceeds were administered in
accordance with law.
17 C-677/11Doux Elevage p.34 and Case T-139-09 France v Commission par.36
18 C-677/11Doux Elevage , paragraph 34, Case  France v Commission, par. 36  
19 C-173/73 Italy v Commission, par.16. "As the funds in question are financed through compulsory
contributions imposed by State legislation and  as this case shows, they are managed and apportioned in
accordance with the provisions of that legislation, they must be regarded as State resources within the
meaning of Article 92, even if they are administered by institutions distinct from the public authorities." 
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indirectly reduce an economic burden that a specific undertaking would normally have
to bear  from its  budget20,  21,  22.  The  advantage  can  take  any form according to  the
wording of Article 107(1) TFEU. It can be a positive economic benefit or a negative
advantage taking the form of relief from an economic burden. State Aid can take the
form  of  a  direct  subsidization,  direct  grants,  guaranties,  loans,  interest  subsidies,
accumulated reserves, debt write-offs, provision of risk capital, sales of real estate at
below market price 23.
But a reasonable  and interesting question comes up in relation to the element of
the “economic advantage”.What happens in the cases where the State acts like a private
investor? The answer can be found  in the Private investor principle24. If the State acts
like  a  private  undertaking,  investing  under  normal  market  conditions  then  its
intervention  cannot  be  qualified  as  State  aid  under  Article  107  (1)  TFEU  (Market
economy  investor  Principle).  This  Principle  is  often  used  by  the  European
Commission25 in  order  to  assess  a  State  aid  measure.  The  question  applying  this
principle is if a private investor would under the same financial market conditions and
the same terms, act exactly as the State which decided to invest by granting the State
aid26 27.
20 C (2013) 6702 final. State aid SA.35164 (2013/NN) – Greece – Compressor Station in Nea 
Messimvria, par.35-36
21 P. Nicolaides ,A. Metaxas., Asymmetric Tax Measures and EU State Aid Law The “Special Solidarity Levy” on
Greek Producers of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources , EStAL 1|2014, pp. 56
22 C-308/101,GIL Insurance Ltd and others v Commissioners of Customs and Excise. par.69 “The concept of aid
encompasses  advantages  granted  by public  authorities  which,  in  various  forms,  mitigate  the  charges  which  are
normally included in the budget of an undertaking (see, inter alia, Case C-310/99 Italy v Commission [2002] ECR I-
2289, paragraph 51).  
23 Ibid, see reference 12, T. Maxian Rusche,C. Micheau, H. Piffaut ,and K. Van de Casteele “The notion of State 
aid”,pp.1934 
24 C-290/07 P Commission  Vs Scott {2010}, par.68. “..the Commission must apply the private investor
test, to determine whether the price paid by the presumed recipient of the aid corresponds to the selling
price  which  a  private  investor,  operating  in  normal  competitive  conditions,  would be  likely to  have
fixed...”
25 European  Commission  Decision  (C(2015)1942  final)  of  25  March  2015  in  Case
SA.38101(Aluminium S.A), par.43. “The Commission therefore concludes that though a prudent private
investor in the market, before a similar situation to that of the complainant in this case would proceed to
arbitration similar to that at issue here, which lays down clear and objective parameters which had to be
followed by  the  experts  during  the  Arbitration  proceedings  fixing  the  invoice.  It  considers  that  the
conduct of the  arbitration agreement was consistent with the behavior of an informed private market
investor  and therefore,  in  line with market  conditions and therefore  Aluminium did not  receive  any
economic advantage within the meaning of Article 107 paragraph 1 of the TFEU, as erroneously claimed
by the complainant.”
26 T-228/99 and T-233/99, Court of the First Instance, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land
Nordrhein- Westfalen Vs European Commission,par. 246. 
27 Ibid, see reference 7,pp. 2071
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-Selectivity. In order to determine whether a measure is selective, that measure has to be
granted to only few undertakings and not to all of the relevant sector, which are actually
in the same legal situation as the undertaking favored. In order to fulfill this element, we
have to clarify if we can identify a specific undertaking or category of undertakings to
which the advantage has been granted and to examine whether there is an advantage to
some undertakings over others28.  In this  sense, as a matter of fact it  is necessary to
connect  the  two  conditions,  “the  economic  advantage  of  the  beneficiary”  to  “the
selectivity”,  as it is obvious that a measure can be interpreted as selective only if it
grants  an  economic  advantage  to  a  specific  undertaking  of  a  sector  while  the
undertakings which are in a comparable factual and legal situation, do not profit in the
same  manner29.  The  assessment  of  the  selectivity  of  a  measure  becomes  very
complicated in cases where the advantage is a “negative” one and has the form of a tax
measure 30. 
-Distortion  of  competition  and  affecting  trade  between  Member  States.  For  the
assessment of the criterion of distortion of competition, the Commission is not required
to show that the aid has an actual effect on competition in practice. It is sufficient to
establish that the aid in question is of such a kind to threaten to distort competition and
to affect trade between Member States. If it is clear that an economic advantage was
granted  to  the  beneficiary,  then  there  is  a  distortion  of  competition  and it  is  quite
irrelevant  if the beneficiary is  a small  undertaking or if  the amount  of the selective
advantage is relatively limited31 32.
28 A. Metaxas., Textbook EU State Aid Law, International Hellenic University, LLM 2014-2015 pp. 5
29 C-403/10,  Mediaset   SPA  vs  Commission,  par.  62:  “In  accordance  with  the  case-law  cited  in
paragraph  36  of  the  present  judgment,  in  order  to  determine  whether  a  measure  is  selective,  it  is
appropriate  to  examine  whether  that  measure  constitutes  an  advantage  for  certain  undertakings  in
comparison with others which are in a comparable factual and legal situation. Accordingly, contrary to
what is claimed by Mediaset, the conditions relating to the selectivity of a State aid measure and the
creation of an economic advantage for a recipient are not entirely independent of each other. A measure
may be considered to be selective only if it is likely to create such an advantage for one recipient while
not doing so for other persons whose situation is comparable to that of the recipient. 
30 H.Schroeter,  T.  Jakob,  R.  Klots,  W.  Mederer,  Europaisches  Wettbewerbsrecht
(NomosKomentar,zweite Auflage 2014). A. Kliemann “Vorschriften uber staatliche Beihilfen-Art. 107-
109 AEUV”.Tax selectivity is divided  into material selectivity were the measures are favouring types of
undertakings, economic sectors, or activities and  regional selectivity were the measures are regionally
selective as they are created to apply in a given geographical zone -a region of a Member State.
31 T-303/05, Acea Electrabel Vs European Commission,{2009},p. II-137,par 48. 
32 T-214/95,  Het  Vlaamse  Gevest  Vs  Commission  ,par.  46  :“Where  a  public  authority  favours  an
undertaking operating in a sector which is characterized by intense competition by granting it a benefit,
there is a distortion of competition or a risk of such distortion. Where the benefit is limited, competition is
distorted to a lesser extent, but it is still distorted. The prohibition in Article 92(1) of the Treaty applies to
14
2. Compatibility of State aid under Article 107 TFEU
Even if the previously mentioned elements of Article 107 (1) TFEU are fulfilled
by a State aid, it might be declared exceptionally as compatible with the internal market
under the basis of Article 107(2), (3) TFEU33. Especially, in cases of aid for energy and
the  environment,  Article  107(3)(c)  TFEU  applies,  which  could  be  in  a  successful
manner characterized as the “catch all provision”34, 35. In order to apply the exception of
Article 107(3)c TFEU, the Commission has to assess: 1) if “the aid measure  pursues an
objective of common interest”36, 2) if there is need for the State intervention,  3) if the
measure is the appropriate instrument37, 4) if the aid measure demonstrates an incentive
effect 38,  5)  if  it  is  proportionate,  and  finally,  6)  if  there  might be  a distortion  of
competition and trade resulting from the State aid for the envisaged measures39. 
From  the  1st  July  2014,  for  the  Energy  and  Environmental  State  Aid  the
Commission has to interpret  Article  107(3)(c)TFEU under the Common Assessment
Principles of the Guidelines 201440 which will be analyzed further down in the next
Chapter of this paper. 
any aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition, irrespective of the amount, in so far as it affects
trade between Member States.  
33 J. Maurici QC, H. Sargent, “State aid in planning and compulsory purchase order cases”, Journal of
Planning & Environment Law 2015,West Law.
34 T.  Lubbig,  M.  Fuchs,  The German  Renewable  Energy  Act  (EEG)  -Unlawful  State  Aid?  ENLR
2/2014, Lexxion. pp.128
35 Commission  Decision  in  case  SA.35255  Aid  to  PSE  Operator  S.A.  for  the  construction  of
Stanisławσw power station and among other energy infrastructure cases: Commission Decisions in cases
N 594/2009Terminal in Świnoujście, Poland; SA.29870 (N 660/2009) Aid to PGNiG for underground gas
storage, Poland; SA.34235 (2012/N) Gas pipeline Rembelszczyzna – Gustorzyn (phase III) Gas pipelines
in  Poland;  SA  33823  (2012/N)  Electricity  cable  Aland  –  Finland  (mainland);  SA.31953  (2011/N)
Construction of a LNG 
36 C(2013) 9041 final. State aid  SA.36870 (2013/N) –  Greece Metering system for transmission system
users, par.20-21. C(2013) 6702 final. State aid SA.35164 (2013/NN) – Greece – Compressor Station in
Nea Messimvria, par.45-51
37 IBID,see reference 36, par. 22.
38 C(2013) 6702 final. State aid SA.35164 (2013/NN) – Greece – Compressor Station in Nea 
Messimvria, par.60-62. 
39 C(2013)  6700  final.  Brussels,  16.10.2013.  State  aid  SA.35165  (2013/NN)  –  Greece,  State  aid
SA.35977 (2012/N) – Greece Upgrade of the Liquefied Natural  Gas (LNG) Terminal in Revithoussa,
par.61- 69
40 Which came to revise the Environmental Guidelines 2008 (2008/C 82/01).
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CHAPTER . 2 
The Energy and Environmental State aid Guidelines 2014-2020 (EEAG) 
1. Generally 
Emphasizing on Environmental and Energy State aid, the Commission decided
to  issue  and  adopt  additionally  to  the  Secondary  law  instruments  the  Energy  and
Environmental  State aid Guidelines  2014-2020 (EEAG). This new set of Guidelines
applied  from the  1st July  2014 and   came  to  revise  “the  Environmental  Guidelines
2008”,  as  part  of  the  Commission’s  State  aid  modernization  agenda41.  Under  the
umbrella of the above agenda and on account of “the Europe 2020 Strategy” several
headline targets42 have been set, including the climate change and energy sustainability.
The main goal of the “the Europe 2020 Strategy” is: “to achieve the best conditions for
smart,  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth; where “smart”  stands  for  developing  an
economy  based  on  knowledge  and  innovation,“sustainable”  for  promoting  a  more
resource-efficient, greener and more competitive economy and “growth” for fostering a
high-employment economy delivering economic, social and territorial cohesion”43. On
22nd January 2014 the Commission proposed that the energy and climate objectives be
met by 2030 in a Communication “A policy framework for climate and energy in the
period from 2020 to 2030”, emphasizing on the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
by 40% relative to the 1990 level, an EU-wide binding target for renewable energy of at
least 27%, renewed ambitions for energy efficiency policies, a new governance system
and a set of new indicators to ensure a competitive and secure energy system44. 
The new Energy and Environmental State Aid Guidelines apply to State aid for
environmental protection or energy objectives which can be considered as compatible
under Article 107(3)(b) or (c)TFEU and they are binding for the European Comission.
On the one hand, the general objective of environmental  aid under the EEAG is to
41 IBID  J.  Maurici  QC,  H.  Sargent,  “State  aid  in  planning  and  compulsory purchase  order  cases”,
Journal of Planning & Environment Law 2015,West Law
42 Energy and Environmental State aid Guidelines 2014-2020 (EEAG), Introduction (3): “ ...To that end,
a number of headline targets have been set, including targets for climate change and energy sustainability:
(i) a 20 % reduction in Union greenhouse gas emissions when compared to 1990 levels;  (ii) raising the
share  of  Union  energy  consumption  produced  from renewable  resources  to  20  %;and  (iii)  a  20  %
improvement in the EU’s energy-efficiency compared to 1990 levels. The first two of these nationally
binding targets were implemented by ‘The climate and energy package’.
43 COM(2010) 2020 final.  “EUROPE 2020 A strategy for  smart,  sustainable and inclusive growth”
,Brussels, 3.3.2010.
44 IBID, see reference 42, introduction (4)
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increase  the  level  of  environmental  protection  compared to  the level  that  would  be
achieved in the absence of the aid. The primary objective of the environmental aid is
undoubtedly the creation  of a low-carbon economy which welcomes alternative  and
more environmental friendly energy sources like the renewable ones. On the other hand,
the  primary  objective  of  the  aid  in  the  energy  sector  is  to  ensure  a  competitive
sustainable  and  secure  energy  system  in  a  well-functioning  Union  energy  market.
Energy aid under the EEAG is committed to supporting the priorities of the energy
strategy of the European Union which focuses on achieving an energy efficient Europe,
building a truly pan-European integrated energy market, empowering consumers and
achieving  the  highest  level  of  safety and security,  extending  Europe's  leadership  in
energy technology and innovation and strengthening the external dimension of the EU
energy market45. However, in relation to the scope of the EEAG, which is defined in
EEAG section 1.1, it is remarkable that for the first time the scope of the Guidelines
includes aid in the Energy sector and not only Environmental State aid as it was the case
in the Environmental Guidelines 2008. 
Under the Primary State Aid law, Article 108 (3) TFEU puts the obligation of
notification to the Commission for any aid scheme which is to be granted or altered. On
the contrary, State aid which falls under the scope of the GBER and the EEAG does not
have  to  be  notified  under  the  Article  108 (3)  TFEU except  if  the  aid  exceeds  the
notification thresholds under section 2 (20) of the EEAG and it is not granted on the
basis of a competitive bidding process  46. The fact that environmental and energy aid
does not have to be  notified if it falls under the Scope of the EEAG, fulfills one of the
objectives of the Guidelines which is the provision of faster decisions, in order finally to
encourage Environmental and Energy aid measures 47. 
2. The Common Assessment Principles under the EEAG
 The Commission has to apply the Common Assessment Principles in order to
consider State aid for environmental  protection and energy objectives as compatible
with  the  internal  market  under  Article  107(3)  b,  c  TFEU.  These  principles  were
45 Com  (2010) 639 final Energy 2020 Communication, par. 5
46 P. Nicolaides, State aid Uncovered,Critical Analysis of Developments in State aid, Lexxion 2014,pp.
258: “Although the EEG do not express it in the same terms, all aid does not fall within the scope of the
environmental provisions of the General Block Exemption Regulation must be notified...”
47 IBID, see reference 42, introduction (11b)
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identified by the Commission in the Communication on State aid modernization of the
8th May 201248 and afterwards they were incorporated  in the EEAG in Section 3.1.
Applying the above principles,  the Commission has to consider a State aid measure
compatible with the internal market only if it satisfies each of the following criteria:
-The State aid measure has to effect contribution to a well-defined objective of
common interest in accordance with Article 107(3) of the TFEU 49.
-There has to be need for State intervention meaning that in each case, that aid
has to be granted by a Member State only if it will bring about a material improvement
that the market alone cannot deliver. This criterion has been analyzed under Section
3.2.2 EEAG in order to define what can be finally interpreted as a market failure by a
Member State and in which cases of market failure the State intervention is necessary.
Within this context, under the EEAG, once a market failure has been identified by a
Member State, before proceeding to intervention in the form of granting an aid scheme
in order to improve the market failure, it is necessary to exhaust any other policies or
measures which are given in order to improve. Only in this case will the Commission
consider that aid is needed and that it will effectively target the market failure, without
effecting  distortion of  trade and competition. 
- The State aid measure has to be in every case the appropriate one, intending
that  the  proposed  aid  measure  is  an  appropriate  policy  instrument  to  address  the
objective of common interest50. It is clearly stated in the EEAG in Section 3.2.3 that if
the  positive  contribution  to  the  common  objective  of  a  State  aid  can  be  achieved
through a less distortive measure, aid cannot be considered as compatible. Therefore, a
Member State has to demonstrate to the Commission in every case of Environmental
and Energy State aid why the direct granting of aid is the most appropriate comparable
to other measures which could be chosen like repayable advantages, tax credits, forms
of aid that are based on financial (debt, equity) instruments.
48 Com(2012)209 final. Brussels, 8.5.2012 , “State Aid Modernisation (SAM)”.
49 C (2015) 2580 final Brussels, 16.04.2015. State aid cases SA.39723, SA.39724, SA.39725, SA.39726,
SA.39731,  SA.39732,  SA.39733,  SA.39735,  SA.39738,  SA.39739,  SA.39741,  SA.39742  (2014/N);
SA.39722,  SA.39727,  SA.39728,  SA.39729,  SA.39730,  SA.39734,  SA.39736,  SA.39740  (2015/NN):
Support to 20 large offshore wind farms under the EEG Act 2014 (Germany). Par.53
50 C(2015) 2356 final. Brussels, 7.4.2015.State Aid SA.39399 (2015/N) – The Netherlands Modification
of SDE+ scheme. Par. “(40) As stated in EEAG point 115, the Commission presumes the existence of a
residual  market  failure  which can  render  State  aid necessary  to  encourage  investments  in  renewable
energy.(41) The Netherlands has explained that without the aid it will not meet its EU 2020 target to
supply at  least  14% of  energy  from renewable  sources  in  2020.  In  2012 the  share  of  energy  from
renewable  sources  in  the  gross  final  consumption  of  energy  in  the  Netherlands  was  only  4.5%,  so
significant  investment  is  still  required.  This  in  turn  requires  additional  funding  because  current  and
projected energy prices in the Netherlands are not sufficient to support investment in renewable energy”.
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-The aid measure has to demonstrate  incentive effect,  as it has to change the
behavior  of  the  undertaking  concerned  in  such  a  way that  it  engages  in  additional
activity which it would not carry out without the aid or which it would carry out in a
restricted or different manner51. Specifically, for the environmental aid and the energy
aid  the  behavior  of  the  beneficiary  has  to  contribute  to  the  increasing  of  the
environmental  protection  or  to  the  improvement  of  the  functioning  of  a  secure,
affordable and sustainable energy market. In any case the aid must not cover the costs
of an activity that the recipient would anyhow incur. Additionally, under the EEAG it is
forbidden to Member States  to grant  aid which compensates  an undertaking for the
normal  business  risk  of  an  economic  activity.  In  accord  with  the  Commission
Environmental and Energy aid has an incentive effect even if the aid is granted in order
to adapt the Union standards of environmental protection and the energy sector, or even
when  the  aid  motivates  an  investment  which  will  contribute  positively  to  the
environmental and energy objective,  even if it exceeds in a positive manner the Union
Standards. Moreover, as the aid does not have to cover costs for an activity which the
beneficiary would anyhow incur, aid  for energy efficiency of large enterprises and the
energy audits is found not to demonstrate incentive effect, because it would be de facto
a compensation for energy audit  required by the Energy-efficiency Directive52.
- The aid has to be  proportional. Therefore, it is crucial that the Commission
pays attention to the amount of aid which has to be limited to the minimum needed to
incentivise the investment which will achieve environmental protection or the energy
objective  aimed  for53.  Either  it  is  the  case  of  an  aid  measure,  which  has  to  be
individually assessed or not, the amount of aid must be less than the eligible costs. The
eligible costs are the net extra investment costs in tangible or in  intangible assets which
51 C(2013) 4424 final,Brussels, 18.12.2013. State aid SA.33995 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) – Germany –
Support for renewable electricity and reduced EEG-surcharge for energy-intensive users. Par.186: “As
the operating aid reduces  the difference  between the market  price and the production costs for  RES
electricity,  undertakings may operate a plant which they otherwise could not operate economically. The
Commission considers that due to the operating aid the aid recipient will change its behaviour so that the
level  of environmental  protection is increased.  On this basis and taking into account  the information
provided by Germany, the Commission considers that the aid will only be granted in cases where it is
necessary and will provide an incentive effect (chapter 3.2 of the EAG). 
52 Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU 
53 C(2015) 2356 final. Brussels, 7.4.2015.State Aid SA.39399 (2015/N) – The Netherlands Modification
of SDE+ scheme. Par. (49) According to point 69 of the EEAG, environmental aid is considered to be
proportionate  if  the  aid  amount  per  beneficiary  is  limited  to  the  minimum  needed  to  achieve  the
environmental  protection  objective  aimed  for.(50)  Point  109  of  the  EEAG  explains  that  in  the
Commission’s view market instruments, such as auctioning or competitive bidding processes to select
beneficiaries  of  aid  to  renewable  sources  should  normally  ensure  that  subsidies  are  reduced  to  a
minimum.
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are directly linked to the achievement of the common objective54. In order to set limits
in a clear manner,  in relation to the maximum amount of environmental and energy
State aid, the Commission decided to include in ANNEX 1 the aid intensities, ensuring
in this way  predictability for Member States and investors.
-  Undue  negative  effects on  competition  and  trade  between  Member  States
caused  by the  aid  measure,  have  to  be  avoided,  so  that  the  overall  balance  of  the
measure is positive55. The Commission has to keep distortions of competition and trade
to a minimum, focusing on the questions: Is the given measure well  targeted to the
market failure it aims to address? Is it proportionate and limited to the extra investment
costs?  And  finally  was  the  selection  process  conducted  in  a  transparent,  non-
discriminatory and open manner, so that other competitors were not unfairly excluded?
Once the above questions have been examined the risk that an aid will unduly distort
competition is more limited56.
-The maximum of  transparency has  to  be  achieved  for  the  granted  aid.  The
Commission, economic operators, and the public, have to be enabled and granted easy
access  to  all  relevant  acts  and to pertinent  information  about  the aid awarded there
under57.  The  Member  States  are  obliged  to  ensure  the  publication  of  the  necessary
information on a State aid website at a national or a regional level 58.
3.The Key Features of the EEAG in relation to the Energy Sector
The Key Features of the EEAG in relation to the Energy Sector are: The State
aid to electricity from renewable energy (The Feed in-premium and the \ Competitive
bidding process), State aid in the form of reductions in funding support for electricity
from renewable sources (for energy intensive sectors), State aid to energy infrastructure.
   
54 C(2013) 4424 final. Brussels, 18.12.2013. State aid SA.33995 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) – Germany –
Support for renewable electricity and reduced EEG-surcharge for energy-intensive users. Par.197 “The
German authorities have provide calculations and robust studies showing that the aid is proportionate in
the sense that it is limited to the difference between market price and production costs and does not lead
to overcompensation (see also calculation shown under section 2.2.2).” 
55 Ibid,C (2015) 2580 final Brussels, 16.04.2015. State aid cases  for Support to 20 large offshore wind
farms under the EEG Act 2014 (Germany), par. 75-79 “The Balancing Test”. 
56 EEAG, Section 3.2.6.2
57 EEAG, Section 3.1 (27)
58 C  (2015)  2356  final.  Brussels,  7.4.2015.State  Aid  SA.39399  (2015/N)  –  The  Netherlands
Modification of SDE+ scheme, par.81-82
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I. State aid to electricity from renewable energy 
In order to support the targets of climate change and energy sustainability59, as
they  are  set  in  “the  European  2020  Strategy”,  the  Guidelines  2014  include  the
conditions for investment and operating aid to energy from renewable sources60. Under
the EEAG operating aid to energy from renewable energy sources can be considered as
compatible with the internal market, from the 1st January 2016 and hereafter, under strict
conditions. Namely,  the new aid  has to be granted as  a premium in addition to the
market  price  whereby  the  generators  sell  its  electricity  directly  in  the  market.  The
beneficiaries are subject to standard balancing responsibilities, unless no liquid intraday
markets exist. Finally, measures have to be put in place to ensure that generators have
no incentive to generate electricity under negative prices61. From the 1st January 2017
and  hereinafter  aid  for  at  least  5%  of  the  planned  new  electricity  capacity  from
renewable energy sources should be granted in  a competitive bidding process on the
basis  of  clear,  transparent  and  non-discriminatory  criteria.  Only  under  exceptional
circumstances  will  the  Member  States  be  able  to  grant  operating  aid  to  generators
producing electricity from renewable sources without a competitive bidding process.
Such case could be given if the Member State demonstrates  that the number of the
projects or the sites which are eligible to the aid are very limited, or that a competitive
bidding process would lead to higher support levels or that it would result in low project
realization rates. However, one case of aid where the competitive bidding process is not
needed, is when the installation which will be subsidized has an installation capacity of
less than 1 MW. 
Additionally to  the more traditional form of aid, the operational one, the EEAG
introduces the aid measure in the form of green certificates62. These certificates can be
granted  by  the  Member  State  to  the  renewable  energy  producer,  who  will  benefit
indirectly because there will be guaranteed demand for his energy, at a price above the
market  price  for  conventional  power.  It  is  obvious  that  the  price  of  this  kind  of
certificates can not be fixed in advance, as it has to be linked to the market supply and
demand.
59 Which are also supported by the Renewable Energy Directive  (RED) 2009/28/EC
60 EEAG, 1.3(5):‘renewable energy sources’ means the following renewable non-fossil energy sources:
wind, solar, aerothermal, geothermal, hydrothermal and ocean energy, hydropower, biomass, landfill gas,
sewage treatment plant gas and biogases
61 EEAG,3.3.2.1(124)
62 EEAG, 3.3.2.4 
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II. State aid in the form of reductions for energy intensive sectors 
Under the EEAG, for the first time, reductions of levies for the funding of RES
are established in order to support  the competitiveness of the EU industries. The main
reason of this reduction is to encourage and promote competitiveness of the European
industry over the international industries where the bill of electricity amounts less, as
this type of  RES support levies are not charged 63. 
Costs  of  financing  renewable  energy  support  are  recovered  from  energy
consumers in principal. The European Union decided that some targeted reductions in
these costs have to be granted in the form of aid to intensive electricity users. This aid
can be granted in the form of reduction to limited market sectors, which are exposed to
a risk of their competitive position due to the funding of energy from renewable sources
as a function of their electro intensity and their exposure to international trade. In the
list of  Annex 3 and 5 of the EEAG, all the sectors which can be considered as eligible
and  are  entitled  to  be  granted  this  aid are  listed. In  order  to  avoid  discrimination
between electricity users and limitation of public acceptance for the support of energy
from the renewable energy sources, the eligible sectors are limited  under the EEAG. In
addition, the Commission has the obligation to apply the rules sensu stricto and with the
maximum of transparency, during the choice of the beneficiary and the assessment  of
this type of aid. 
III. State aid to energy infrastructure 
In order for the Member State to meet the climate and the energy goals set by
the  European  Union,  many  investments  have  to  be  made  so  that  modern  energy
infrastructures  will  be  available,  ensuring  security  of  supply  and  enabling  the
integration of renewable sources of energy. But, as a matter of fact, as many of the
market operators of the Member States are not financially in the position to deliver the
necessary innovative infrastructure, State aid has to be granted so that the market failure
can be overcome64 .
 
63 IP/14/400,State aid: Commission adopts new rules on public  support for environmental protection
and energy EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRESS RELEASE Brussels, 9 April 2014. 
64 EEAG 3.8
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CHAPTER. 3 
The  new EEAG 2014-2020  and the impact in the German and the Greek Energy
Sector
1. The German Energy Sector. European Commission Vs German EEG-Act  
I. Generally
The Renewable Energy Directive (RES Directive)65, which was implemented in
2009, promoted the renewable sources of energy, by setting targets of achieving a 20
per cent share of renewable energy in the final energy consumption. As a matter of fact,
Member States were forced to implement the RES Directive. Each one of the Member
States  had  to  address  the  existing  national  market  failure,  by  choosing  the  most
matching  support  schemes  out  of  the  ones  which  were  defined  under  the  RES
Directive66. The Member States were obliged by the European Union to formulate a
national  strategy in  order  to  finally  reach  the  2020 targets  which  where  set  by the
European Union envisaging the climate change and the energy sustainability67. 
Germany  conceived  the  successful  legal  instrument  “Erneuerbare  Energien
Gesetz”(EEG) in 2000, which was the German Renewable Energy Act. The main  goal
of this Act was to promote and therefore  support the Green electricity. The EEG Act of
2000 was revised several  times  in order to become more  developed68.  Amendments
were made in 2004, 2009, 2012 and in 2014.
65 Directive  2009/28/EC of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  23  April  2009 on  the
promotion  of  the  use  of  energy  from  renewable  sources  and  amending  and  subsequently  repealing
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC.
66 RES Directive,Article 2 (k): ‘support scheme’ means any instrument, scheme or mechanism applied
by a Member State or a group of Member States, that promotes the use of energy from renewable
sources by reducing the cost of that energy, increasing the price at which it can be sold, or increasing,
by means of a renewable energy obligation or otherwise, the volume of such energy purchased. This
includes, but is not restricted to, investment aid, tax exemptions or reductions, tax refunds, renewable
energy obligation support schemes including those using green certificates, and direct price support
schemes including feed-in tariffs and premium payments;
67 R. Callaerts, State Aid for the Production of Electricity from Renewable Energy Resources, European
Energy and Environmental Law Review, February 2015. 
68The EEG Act 2000, entered into force in 1 April 2000. The Commission assessed its compatibility
with the European State aid Law. The Commission came to the final decision on the 22 th of the May 2000
(OJ C 164,10.7.2002,p.5), that the German Renewable Energy Act did not involve State aid.   
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II. The assessment of the Compatibility under State Aid law of the  EEG-Act 2012
The most crucial revision of the EEG-Act was made with the amendments of
2012. The amended Act contained many new features that were not present in the EEG-
Act 2000 and which had been highly questioned as whether they constituted unlawful
State aid or not, as they were innovative schemes!
Namely, financial support was granted to the producers of RES electricity and
electricity from mining gas. The measures set out in the EEG-Act 2012 were granted in
the  form  of  Feed-in  tariffs69,  market  premiums70 and  flexibility  premiums.  These
measures were combined with an horizontal equalization mechanism71, and the result of
this system was that finally a“EEG surcharge”72 was imposed to the final electricity
consumers. This surcharge was determined  on a yearly basis by the German TSOs73.
The German Federal Network Agency74 was responsible for the monitoring of the above
mechanism. Moreover, in the EEG Act 2012 a reduction of the above surcharge was set
out, “the EEG Surcharge”, in favor of the German electricity suppliers which benefited
from the “Green power Privilege”75. Finally, the EEG Act 2012 has set out the “Cap on
the EEG surcharge” for energy intensive users (EUIs)76. 
69 With Feed-in tariff the network operators of the German energy market were obliged to purchase
electricity produced within their network  area  from renewable energy sources and from mining gas,at a
purchased price fixed by law.  
70 Market premiums. The Res producers had the right to sell their electricity directly on the market, for
which  the  network  operators-Distribution  System  operators  (DSO)  where  obliged  to  pay  a  market
premium above the market price.  
71 Part 4, Section 36 EEG Act 2012.The cost of the feed-in tariff and the market premium was passed on
to the German Transmission System Operator's (TSOs). Theywere obliged to purchase RES electricity
from the DSOs and to compensate the DSOs fully for the feed-in tariff's or the market premium.
72 Part 4, Section 37 EEG Act 2012. The German TSOs had the obligation to sell electricity on the spot
market and in the case that the market price was not sufficient to cover the financial burden imposed on
them by the obligation to pay the feed-in tariff's and the market premium to the Green producers, they had
to demand from electricity suppliers a payment proportional to the the respective quantity of electricity
delivered  to  their  final  consumers.  This  was  the  so  called  “EEG surcharge”.This  surcharge    was
determined under the discretion of the TSOs yearly.
73 Part 4, Section 37(2) EEG Act 2012
74 Bundesnetzagentur (BNetsA)
75 Part 4, Section 39 EEG Act 2012.The EEG surcharge decreased for electricity suppliers in a given
calendar  year  by 2.0  cents  per  kilowatt  hour.  The Res electricity  they delivered  had  to  fulfill  three
conditions: 1) the RES electricity had to be bought directly form the national RES electricity producers,
2) at least 50% of the electricity the suppliers delivered to the end consumers had to be RES electricity or
electricity from mining gas and 3) at least 20 % of the electricity had to come from wind or solar.   
76 Part 4, Section 40-41 EEG Act 2012. The Cap on the EEG surcharge for EIUS was granted only
under the conditions that: 1) The EIUs had to be active in the manufacturing sector, 2) they had to have
an electricity consumption of at least 1 Gwh and 3) their electricity costs amount had to be at least 14% of
their gross added value. 
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On the 18th  of December 201377, the European Commission decided to initiate
the procedure of Article 108(2) TFEU, in respect of the support to electricity produced
from RES and mining gas under the EEG Act 2012 and the EEG-surcharge for EIUs. 
Germany didn't notify to the Commission the amended EEG 2012 before setting
it in to force, despite the fact that it was obliged to. The Commission alleged under the
formal proceedings that the EEG-Act 2012 constituted new unlawful aid as of the 1 st
January  2012.  The  Commission  claimed  that  the  “green  power  privilege”  and  the
reduced  EEG  surcharge  for  EUIs,  constituted  prohibited  State  aid  measures  under
Article 107(1) TFEU.
 Article 107(1) TFEU and the new features of the EEG Act 2012
Did the new features grant a selective advantage and did they have an impact on
competition and trade in the internal market?  The Commission assessed that the EEG
surcharge constituted a selective advantage for the RES electricity producers, because it
was only in favour of them and through the Feed-in tariffs  and the premiums,  they
obtained more than what they would obtain on the market. The Commission assessed
additionally that  the “green power privilege” constituted a selective advantage because
it granted a reduced EEG surcharge for the electricity suppliers (and indirectly RES
electricity producers)78. Finally, the Commission decided that a selective advantage was
given to  the EIUs in  the manufacturing  sector,  because only undertakings  from the
manufacturing  sector  (selectivity)  were  relieved  from  a  burden   that  they  would
normally have to bear. As far as the distortion on the competition and the trade in the
internal  market  was concerned,  the electricity  market  was liberalized  and electricity
producers were engaged in trade between Member States and also the EIUs were active
in sectors in which trade among Member States took place79. Finally, the Commission
assessed that the above advantages were imputable to the State because the measures
77 C(2013)  4424final.  Brussels,18.12.2013.State  Aid  SA.33995–  Germany  Support  for  renewable
electricity and reduced EEG surcharge for energy intensive users. 
78 IP/13/1283,Brussels, 18 December 2013 The "green electricity privilege" (§39 of the EEG-Act) could
possibly result in discriminatory taxation. The reduced EEG-surcharge is available to suppliers only if
50% of the electricity portfolio is sourced from domestic renewable electricity produced in plants that are
not already more than 20 years in operation. This seems to discriminate between domestic and imported
electricity  from  renewable  sources  produced  in  similar  plants.  In  the  formal  investigation,  the
Commission will examine in more detail whether the discrimination would exist only in so far as the
imported electricity has not already benefitted from support in the country of origin. 
79 C(2013)  4424final.  Brussels,18.12.2013.State  Aid  SA.33995–  Germany  Support  for  renewable
electricity and reduced EEG surcharge for energy intensive users, par.75-80
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were established by law and the grant of the reduction of the surcharge was entitled by
the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA). 
The most difficult task for the Commission was to examine if the in question
support measures involved State resources! What did the Commission decide for the
EEG-Act 12 and specifically for the equalization mechanism which was established and
which granted to the TSOs the right to impose the surcharge? The TSOs were in this
case not State owned companies80, 81. Despite this fact the TSOs were strictly monitored
by the State in their administration of the EEG-surcharge. As far as the transfer of the
resources is concerned, it has been established under the case law that it is not necessary
in order to find under 107(1) TFEU State aid, to have transfer of State resources for the
advantage  granted  to  the  beneficiary82.  The  resources  could  at  no  moment  be  the
property of the State! Additionally, it has been accepted many times under case law that
the resources can constitute State resources even if they are merely under the control of
the State83. Additionally, the fact that the surcharges were imposed by State legislation
and were managed and apportioned in accordance with the provisions of the legislation
implies the transfer of State resources and State imputability84. 
On this basis the Commission stated that the State has established detailed rules
governing the use and the destination of the EEG surcharge and therefore the State was
granted extensive control  to monitor  the financial  flows. Coming to the preliminary
conclusion,  the  Commission  decided  that  the  TSOs  are  not  free  to  establish  the
surcharge but on the contrary they are strictly monitored by the State and in this sense
they were designated to administer the EEG surcharge, the revenues of which finally
have constituted State resources.
About the reduction of the surcharge for EIU, the Commission decided that it
was  a  fact  that  the  prospective  beneficiaries  of  the  reduction  had  to  apply  for  the
80 C379/98, PreussenElektra AG  v Schleswag AG, in the presence of Windpark III GmbH and Land
Schleswig-Holstein,{2001}. par.57 and 58. 
81 C-206/06,Essent Netwerk Nord and Others,{2008},par.66-69. 
82 C-677/11Doux Elevage p.34 and Case T-139-09 France v Commission, par.36
83 C-677/11Doux Elevage, paragraph 34,Case  France v Commission, par. 36  
84 C-173/73 Italy v Commission, par.16. "As the funds in question are financed through compulsory
contributions imposed by State legislation and as this case shows, they are managed and apportioned in
accordance with the provisions of that legislation, they must be regarded as State resources within the
meaning of Article 92, even if they are administered by institutions distinct from the public authorities." 
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granting to the BAFA, which verified the request on its discretion. In this means, its was
obvious that indirectly the State had the control of choosing to whom the reduction will
be finally  granted!  In the  same manner,  the  “green power privilege”  reduction  was
granted to the suppliers after their request to the BNetza, which means that the State
monitored  once again the granting on its discretion.           
The Commission came to the preliminary conclusion that the EEG-Act 2012
entailed State aid in favour of producers of RES electricity and electricity from mining
gas and that the reduced EEG surcharge entailed State aid for EIU85. Germany had the
stand still obligation and therefore it was not allowed to apply the measures, before the
Commission came to a Decision .  
 
Was there finally a justification for the unlawful State aid measures of the EEG
Act 2012? 
The  unlawful  State  aid  features  of  the  EEG-Act  2012  could  be  justified  as
compatible  applying Article  107(3)c TFEU and the Guidelines on the State aid  for
environmental protection 2008 (EAG)86. 
The  Feed-in  tariffs,  the  market  premiums  and  the  flexibility  premiums  as
support schemes for RES electricity producer's were found by the Commission to be
compatible according to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU in the light of  the EAG 2008, as they
were  calculated  by  the  German  authorities  in  accordance  with  the  methodology
presented under the EAG 2008 87 and they did not lead to overcompensation of the RES
electricity producers. 
By contrast,  the Commission  had concerns  that  two aspects  of the EEG-Act
2012 were not in line with EU  State aid rules. Namely,  the surcharge reduction for
energy  intensive  companies appeared  to  be  financed  from  a  state  resource.  The
reduction  was  available  only  to  undertakings  of  the  manufacturing  sector  having  a
consumption of at least 1 GWh/a and with electricity costs representing 14% of their
gross  added  value.  The  reductions  seemed  to  give  the  beneficiaries  a  selective
advantage that was  likely to distort competition within the EU internal market. The
85 C(2013)  4424final.  Brussels,  18.12.2013.State  Aid  SA.33995–  Germany  Support  for  renewable
electricity and reduced EEG surcharge for energy intensive users, par.148
86 The  EEAG 2014-2020 where  until  than  not  completed,  but  only  a  Draft  was  published  by  the
Commission on the 18 December 2013.   
87 Point 109 of the EAG 2008.
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EAG 2008 did not foresee the possibility of such reductions. At the same time,  the
Commission considered that under certain conditions, reductions on the financing of
renewable electricity could be justified for energy-intensive users in order to prevent
carbon  leakage.  The  Commission  insisted  on  a  thorough  examination  procedure  to
clarify whether the reductions for energy-intensive companies  could be justified and
whether they were proportionate and do not unduly distort competition. 
As far as the support scheme of the "green electricity  privilege"  (§39 of the
EEG-Act)  is  concerned,  the  Commission  decided  that  it  could  possibly  result  in
discriminatory taxation. The reduced EEG-surcharge was available to suppliers only if
50%  of  the  electricity  portfolio  was  sourced  from  domestic  renewable  electricity
produced in plants that were not already more than 20 years in operation. This seemed
to  discriminate  between  domestic  and  imported  electricity  from  renewable  sources
produced  in  similar  plants.  The  Commission  decided  to  examine  in  the  formal
investigation, in more detail whether the discrimination would exist only in so far as the
imported electricity has not already benefited from support in the country of origin.
The Commission came to the decision that the support schemes facilitated the
development of  certain economic activities and that the reduction of the EEG surcharge
served  to  protect  the  international  competitiveness  of  EUIs,  as  the  energy  costs
constitute for the manufacturing sector a significant operating cost. It was noted that if
the EEG Act would not establish the reduction for the EUIs, the  ambiguous Climate
Change  Strategy  of  Germany  would  finally  lead  to  the  financial  difficulties  of  the
manufacturing sector. Third parties were invited by the Commission  to present their
view,  raising  the  question  whether  the  reduced  EEG-surgharge  could  be  viewed as
contributing to an objective of common interest, meaning environmental protection, by
enabling  Germany  to  secure  financing  means  for  its  support  to  the  production  of
renewable energy and the reaching of the EU targets of reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions88. The Commission invited Germany to submit for each of the sectors that
benefited from the reduction additional information89 and Germany was requested to
demonstrate that the same results could not be obtained with less aid. The Commission
88 C(2013)4424final.Brussels,18.12.2013.State  Aid  SA.33995–  Germany  Support  for  renewable
electricity and reduced EEG surcharge for energy intensive users, par.226
89 IBID,see reference 88, par. 236
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doubted that improving the  competitiveness via  the  reduction for the German  EIUs
would not distort competition in the internal market90 . 
  The EEAG 2014-2020 came exactly on time in order to save the  EEG-Act
2012!
On the 1st of July 2014 the new EEAG 2014-2020 came into force. As it was
analyzed above, one of the key features of the new Guidelines was the State aid in the
form of reductions in funding support for electricity from renewable sources (for energy
intensive sectors), under Section 3.7.2. This form of State aid was for the first time
included in the new Guidelines! 
On the 25th  of November 2014 the Commission issued its final decision with
respect to the EEG-Act 201291. The Commission stated that Germany had not notified
the support schemes as it was obliged to and therefore they constituted unnotified State
aid. The Commission declared that the support to renewable energy production under
the  EEG-Act  2012  was  in  line  with  the  EAG  2008,  because  it  did  not  lead  to
overcompensation, as it was limited to grant aid equal to compensate the extra costs of
RES production that exceeded the market price for electricity.  
The remarkable point of the final decision was in relation to the support scheme
of the reduction for EIUs! The Commission decided in favour of the compatibility of
the  scheme  under  the  novel  EEAG  2014-2020,  as  it  was  included  in  the  new
Guidelines!  But  tricky retroactivity   issues  came up!   The new Guidelines  contain
retro-activity provisions  92. They apply also to non-notified reductions granted before
the 1st July of 2014,  when they came into force. This obviously had a positive and a
negative effect on the EEG-Act 2012! The Commission approved the adjustment plan
proposed by Germany for the reduction on the EEG-Surgharge applied in 2013-2014 on
90 T-134/14 Germany v Commission. Court Proceedings where initiated  in front of the General Court
against   the  final  Decision  of  the  Commission  18-12-13.Additionally  many  third  parties  joined  the
procedure  Joined  cases:  T172/14  Stahlwerk  Bous  v  Commission,  T-173/14  Weser  Wind  v
Commission,T174/14 Georgsmarienhutte v Commission ,T178/14 Friedrich Wilhelms-Huette Eisengus v
Commission ,T-183/14Schmiedag v Commission.  
91 C(2014)  8786 final.  Brussels,  25.11.2014.State  Aid  SA.33995–  Germany Support  for  renewable
electricity and reduced EEG surcharge for energy intensive users. 
92 EEAG 2014-2020 par.193-249-249. Therefore all Member States were required by the Commission to
submit an adjustment plan to progressively bring non-notified reductions in line with the criteria of the
EEAG  2014-2020.  The  goal  of  this  action  was  to  ensure   a  smooth  transition  for  the  companies
concerned.   
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the basis  of  the novel  EEAG. The outcome was that  on the  one  hand,  the support
scheme rescued aid granted  to EUIs in the years 2013 and 2014, but on the other hand,
the retroactive examination of the already granted aid schemes disclosed some cases
where  the  actual  reduction  granted  to  the  EUIs  exceeded  the  levels  set  under  the
adjustment  plan.  This  additional  reduction  involved,  of  course,  an  inappropriate
economic advantage granted to some EUIs incompatible aid with the internal market as
it led to distortion of the competition. The Commission ordered Germany to recover the
incompatible granted aid to EUIs  with interest beard93.        
This decision of the Commission94 has been challenged in front of the European
Court  of  Justice.  Germany  claims95 that  the  Court  has  to  annul  the  Commission's
decision relying on three pleas: “manifest errors of assessment in the evaluation of the
facts”96, “no ‘favouring’ through the special compensation scheme”97 and “no granting
of the alleged favouring by the State or through State resources”98.  The case is still
pending. 
Conclusively,the  EEG-Act  2012,  might  have  been  challenged  by  the
Commission, but it can not be refused that it constituted “a step in the right direction as
it acknowledges the need for exemptions from charges if a RES funding mechanism
threatens the competitiveness of an undertaking on which the relevant RES charge is
levied”99. The EEG-Act 2012 established an important Strategy for the promotion of
RES electricity, by setting out important and innovative supporting schemes, the most
important of which was the EEG-surcharge reduction, which undoubtedly constituted
93 According to Chapter V of the Commission  Regulation 794/2004 
94 C(2014)  8786 final.  Brussels,  25.11.2014.State  Aid  SA.33995–  Germany Support  for  renewable
electricity and reduced EEG surcharge for energy intensive users.
95 T-47/15,  Federal  Republic  of  GermanyVs  European  Commission.  The  resume will  be  available
at:http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=T-47/15
96 Germany claims  that  the  European  Commission  misunderstood the  underlying  facts,  namely the
functioning of the Law for the priority of renewable energy sources,  in particular the financial  flows
system under that law. In addition, the Commission misunderstood the role ‘of the State’ as legislator and
as body with responsibility for  supervisory authorities  and incorrectly deduced a situation of  control
therefrom No ‘favouring’ through the special compensation scheme
97 Germany claims that the European Commission erred in law in applying Article107(1) TFEU by
accepting, contrary to the case-law of the Court of Justice, that energy-intensive users had been favoured.
98 Germany claims that the European Commission also erred in law in applying Article107(1) TFEU in
this respect when it accepted that public authorities had control over the assets of the various private
companies participating in the regime of the Law on the priority of renewable energy sources.
99 T.  Lubbig,  M.  Fuchs,  The German  Renewable  Energy  Act  (EEG)  -Unlawful  State  Aid?  ENLR
2/2014, Lexxion, pp.122.  
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an  inspiration for the EU and was therefore included in the EEAG 2014-2020, after two
years, for the first time.  
III. The assessment of the Compatibility with the State Aid law of the EEG-Act
2014
The EEG-Act was again revised in 2014. In April 2014, Germany notified the
amendments in order to achieve the needed legal predictability before taking the EEG-
Act 2014 into force.  The Commission found that the new EEG-Act was compatible
with the European State aid Law100. The Commission applied the Common Assessment
Principles of the EEAG 2014-2020 in order to assess if the State aid measures of the
EEG-Act 2014 constituted State aid for environmental protection and energy objectives
compatible  with  the  internal  market  under  Article  107(3)c  TFEU.  The Commission
declared the EEG-Act 2014 as compatible and decided not to raise objections. 101
Conclusively,  the  EEG-Act  2014  provides  support  for  the  production  of
electricity  from renewable energy sources  and from mining gas.  It  also reduces  the
financial burden on energy-intensive users and certain auto-generators by reducing their
level of payment of the EEG-surcharge. Finally, the EEG-Act 2014 provides that the aid
will  be  progressively  allocated  through  tenders  which  will  gradually  be  opened  to
operators located in other Member States102. The Commission's statement was clear, the
EEG Act 2014 will be successful in furthering EU environmental and energy objectives
without unduly distorting competition in the Single Market. Someone would dare to say
that the  German Renewable Energy Sources Act could be a model for the promotion of
renewable energies worldwide. 
IV. Is the list of the benefiting industries in the EEAG 2014-2020 exclusive?  
In the EEAG 2014-2020 the surcharge reductions are granted depending on the
sector in  which the EIU concerned is  active103 and the energy consumption  and the
electricity  intensity  of  the  production  concerned.  As  it  has  been  already  addressed
100 C(2014)5081final.Brussels,23.07.2014.State  Aid SA.38632– Germany EEG 2014 Reform of the
Renewable Energy Law. 
101 IBID,see reference 100, par.341 after. The Conclusion. 
102 IP/14/867  Commission,  Press  Release.  Brussels,23  July  2014.State  aid:  Commission  approves
German renewable energy law EEG 2014. 
103 EEAG 2014-2020 , Annex 3  and Annex 5.
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above, the list of Annex 3 and 5 of the EEAG 2014-2020 contain the sectors listed
which can be considered as eligible and are entitled to be granted State aid in the form
of reductions in funding support for electricity from renewable sources. The eligible
sectors are limited  under the EEAG and the Commission has the obligation to apply the
rules  sensu stricto and with the maximum of transparency, during the choice of the
beneficiary and the assessment  of this type of aid.
 
Annex 3 and 5 have caused concerns to some industry Sectors in Germany,
which  were  finally  ruled  out  of  the  list  with  the  prospective  beneficiaries  of  the
reduction. In the case Milchindustrie-Verband eV and Deutscher Raiffeisenverband eV
vs the European Commission an application was filled on the 19th of September 2014 in
front  of  the  general  Court,  claiming  that  the  Court  had  to  Annul  the  defendant’s
Communication  2014/C 200/01 of 28 June 2014 on the Guidelines  on State  aid for
environmental protection and energy 2014-2020, in so far as the processing industry
(NACE 10.51) is not mentioned in Annex 3 although it satisfies the criteria set out in
Section 3.7.2 of the Guidelines 2014-2020104. 
It is remarkable that the Court alleged that the existence of the EEAG do not
prevent a Member State to notify to the Commission new Aid which will grant  a relief
to a sector which is not included in Annex 3, either because they assess, in consultation
with the industries concerned, that the specific sector fulfills the criteria in order to be
added  in  the  list  in  the  annex  or  because  it  believes  that  these  conditions  can  not
lawfully be determined by the Commission105. The Commission might finally come to a
decision106 after  applying the EEAG, finding that  the proposed relief  constitutes  aid
incompatible with the internal market. However, this decision would be likely to cause
direct legal effects for the undertakings to which reduction would be granted. These
104 T-670/14,  Milchindustrie-Verband  eV  and  Deutscher  Raiffeisenverband  eV  v  European
Commission.Par. 13, The applicants seek the annulment of the contested Guidelines, as their sector is not
included  in  Annex  3,  while  showing  intensity  and  trade  intensity  electricity  more  than  10%.  The
applicants point out that Annex 3 is exhaustive and that its content should be faithfully transposed into
German law. Therefore, the sectors listed in Annex 3 includes, according to the applicants, in List 1 of
Annex 4 of the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (German Law on renewable energy sources) of 21 July
2014 (BGBl. 2014 I, p. 1066 hereinafter: EEG 2014), concerning the areas which may qualify for relief.
Entities listed in Annex 5 areas, including the milk-industry, includes, according to the applicants, List 2
of Annex 4 of the EEG 2014, and Article 64 of the Act provides for companies belonging to these sectors
stricter  conditions  for  granting  relief.  Consequently,  according  to  the  applicants,  only  a   few  milk
-industries  meet  these  strict  conditions  qualifying  relief,  which  seriously  threatens  international
competitiveness and the existence of approximately 80% of German Milk industries.
105 IBID,see reference 104 par. 30. 
106 Under Article 7, paragraph 5 of Regulation No 659/1999
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industries could, like any Member State concerned, challenge the validity of the adopted
Commission decision before the Court and, in particular, claim that the specific sector
should have been included in Annex 3. 
Conclusively,  the Court finally rejected the claim of the above  industries as
inadmissible, because the Federal Republic of Germany was not obliged either legally
or de facto to adapt its legislation on concessions in order to make it compatible with
the  contested  Guidelines  and,  secondly,  that  the  legal  situation  of  the  represented
companies  is not directly  affected by the non-inclusion of the sector  in Annex 3107.
Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to  remark  that  this  case  did give to  the  industries  not
included in the Annex 3 and   5  of the EEAG a very important tread in order to assert
the  reduction  in  funding support  for  electricity  from renewable  sources  (for  energy
intensive sectors), under Section 3.7.2 in front of the Commission. 
2. The Greek Energy Sector  and the EEAG 2014-2020
I. Generally 
Up to this day the Greek Government has not achieved to implement the new
revised plan for the promotion and support of RES electricity adapted to the new EEAG
2014-2020. The process of adopting the new EEAG 2014-2020 in the Greek Electricity
market, has been significantly delayed. It is undoubtedly a fact, that the Greek Strategy
for granting State aid in order to promote the production of Electricity from Renewable
resources has been disappointingly  unsuccessful until today! 
In May 2010, the Greek Parliament adopted the legislation on Renewable energy
sources with the Law No.3851/2010, FEK 85 A, 4-6-2010 which partially transported
the RES Directive 2009/28/EC. Additionally, the Law No. 3851/2010 was amended by
Article 39 of Law No.4062/2012, which came in force as of the 30 th March 2012. This
amendment  led  to  the  full  transport  of  the  RES Directive  into  the  Greek  National
Legislation.  Greece  chose to  promote  renewable energy sources,  attracting  investors
with Feed-in tariffs108, which was one of the incentives provided by the RES Directive.
This support  scheme came to reduce the risk of the investments  for the Renewable
electricity producers, fixing the price of which the electricity producers would sell the
107 T-670/14,Milchindustrie-Verband  eV  and  Deutscher  Raiffeisenverband  eV  v  European
Commission.Par. 46
108 T.Panagos, Hanbook for Energy Law, International Hellenic University 2015.  
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electricity  produced109.  As a matter  of  fact,  this  support  scheme made producing of
electricity  from  renewable  sources  and  especially  of  “Photo-voltaic  systems”110and
“Wind farms” much more attractive even for investors which were in most cases not
coordinated Businesses but inexperienced individuals who were highly attracted by the
high Feed-in tariffs. It is remarkable that Greece managed to have the highest Feed-in
tariff for electricity produced by photo-voltaic systems in Europe in 2012. The result
was a huge deficit of the Special RES account111. The Government decided to apply
several types of measures112 in order to ensure that the  payment mechanism for RES
will survive. Great instability in the Greek Electricity Market was caused because of the
wrong Strategy for the Promotion of RES in Greece113.
 
II. The Feed-in tariffs in the Greek energy market 
 RES producers were attracted by the Greek Government in a wrong way as the
State  support  scheme  was  granted  in  the  form  of  Feed-in  tariffs,  which  were  not
unlawful as such, but they were  granted in a completely wrong manner, which finally
had as a result the collapse of the Greek RES promoting Strategy and the distortion of 
109 RES electricity has been selled to the Transmission Operator (Public Power Cooperation S.A Hellas
(PPC)  which  is  “the  dominant  player  ”  in  the  Greek  Electricity  Market)  to  which  grid  they  where
connected after receiving the License issued by the Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE).many cases
which felled under “the Photo-voltaic Systems  License exception” and the “Wind farms exception”,
producers had not to pass the License process in front of the RAE. The Licensing process for electricity
producers from renewable sources in Greece under the Law No. 3468/2006 was complicated and time
demanding,therefore it was revised in order to promote RES in the electricity  markets. Amendments
where done with the Law No. 3851/2010 and the Law. No 4001/2011.The exception of the Production
license rules where applied for the photo-voltaic systems 1 MW and for Wind farms of up to 100KW.    
110 A bonus of up to 10% was provided in the Feed in tariff, for the photo-voltaic systems based on the
clause of  Local  Content Requirement for Photo-voltaic plants,using equipment originating from the
European  Union.  The  Pricing  of  electric  energy  produced  by  RES  stations  was  calculated  on  the
provisions of Law No. 3851/2010.
111 The  Feed-in  tariff's  had  to  been  paid  to  RES  producers  which  had  a  signed  power  purchase
agreement, which would be fully refunded to the Greek Transmision System Operator (TSO) and the PPC
through a  special  account  managed  by the  TSO.  This  account  was  intended  to  fully  cover  the  cost
difference between the more expensive RES feed-in tariff paid to RES producers and the system marginal
floating price paid to the TSO. But one thing that was taking wrongly for granted, was the fact that the
receivables of the special account had to equal the total RES costs that LAGIE had to pay to all Greek
RES producers for the total amount of energy generated by their RES at the feed-in tariff which was
vested under their power purchase agreement.
112 The “solidarity tax levies” where imposed in a selective manner to RES producers for the years 2012
– 2014.This tax levies have been highly debated as they were imposed to RES producers  in a  Selective
manner, as electricity producers from fossil fuels were exempted of this tax measure which automatically
gave them an competitive edge. It is obvious that this measure came to reset the balance which had been
lost in the Greek Electricity market because of the  granting of the State aid in the form of high Feed in
tariff's to the RES producers the past years. One of the aims of the Solidarity  tax levy was to support the
deficit of the  Special Account.
113 The Greek Parliament adopted in November 2012 the Law No 4093/2012 and in May 2013 Law No
4152/2013, which introduced retroactive measures additionally to the reduction of the feed in tariff's
34
competition. Despite the fact that the balance of the Electricity market was affected by
the high Feed-in tariffs, it has  never been examined by the European Commission as
unlawful State Aid. But why? It is clear that under the existing case law, Feed in tariff's
do not constitute prohibited State aid under Article 107 (1) TFEU. But what happens
with very high Feed-in tariffs as the one of the Greek photo-voltaic systems? Even if it
were accepted that the high Feed-in tariffs granted a selective advantage to the Greek-
RES producers causing distortion of competition, it finally could be justified under the
“catch all provision”, Article 107 (3)  TFEU and the EAG 2008 as the measure of the
Feed-in-tariffs  was  included  in  the  EAG.  Although,  in  the  case  of  individual
examination of the Greek Feed-in tariffs granted until 2013, there still remains an open
question: What if the high Feed-in tariffs, which have undoubtedly caused distortion in
the Greek Energy Market, had been examined as an overcompensation scheme? Would
then unlawful State aid be involved? In any case, the result of the Feed-in tariffs  in
Greece was not conductive for the Greek Energy Market.
III. Criticism 
Conclusively, Greece has pledged to the EU that by 2020 renewable electricity
will reach at least 40%. Under the obligations arising from the third Memorandum, the
new mechanism should be finalized very soon and be compatible with EEAG 2014-
2020 issued by the European Commission.  The new model  will  replace  the current
framework,  which is based on  Feed-in tariffs. Greece has to implement  the Feed-in
premiums and the competitive binding process in order to grant compatible and lawful
support to the RES electricity producers. Over the past years, this mechanism, though
correct in philosophy, caused major problems due to poor implementation, which led to
the  accumulation  of  significant  deficits  in  the  Special  Account  of  LAGIE  on  the
compensation of RES, as has been addressed above. Without any doubt, Greece has to
make a new start in its RES electricity market. The EEAG 2014-2020 remain Soft Law
and are therefore surely not binding for the Member States! Hence, given the fact that
the Commission is bound to apply these Guidelines in the examination process of every
aid measure granted in order to declare it as compatible or not, it  is surely a clever
choice for Greece to implement the Guidelines in its system as soon as possible!
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CHAPTER. 4
State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU and the Greek industries
1. The Greek Industries as intensive electricity consumers  
While the European Union has demanding  plans  and targets in favour of the
environment and renewable energy sources, which have to be reached by each Member
State,  the Greek Energy Market still  struggles with  structural  and inner problems in
relation to electricity and its tariffs. 
The  Greek  State  controls  51%  of  the  country’s  electricity  company  Public
Power Corporation S.A. , which is DEI S.A114. DEI S.A enjoys the status of monopoly
in the Greek electricity market and is therefore the dominant player.  This monopoly
makes the intensive electricity users totally dependent on it, as the intensive users do
not  have  any  other  options  to  turn  to  in  the  Greek  Energy  Market.  Although  the
liberalisation of the Greek electricity market started in 2001, it has had no results until
today. DEI S.A, having a total monopoly in generation, transmission and distribution,
sets the tariffs unilaterally for all kind of customers, including the industrial sector and
the energy-intensive companies, which have no alternatives for electricity supply. The
monopoly of DEI S.A has caused many problems to the Greek industries! One of the
most crucial disputes which illustrates exactly how the competitiveness of the Greek
Industries  are affected by the Greek dominant player, is the dispute between DEI S.A
and Aluminium S.A.
2. The Aluminium S.A Cases
I.  Aluminium S.A Vs European Commission and DEI S.A
Aluminium of Greece was established in 1960 and was a large company active
in the production of aluminium as raw material. In July 2007, the Aluminium of Greece
was  split  in  two  companies  Aluminium  S.A  and  Endesa  Hellas.  The  company
114 PPC has a competitive advantage, as it enjoys preferential access and has special mining rights to
lignite (98% of the total active reserves owned by the state), a strategic natural resource in Greece used
for electricity generation. Greece is the second largest lignite producer in Europe and fifth in the world. It
also exploits all major hydro plants in Greece.
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Aluminium S.A has taken over the aluminium  production and the company Endessa
Hellas is active in the electricity production.
In July 2008,  the Commission  received  complaints  that  Aluminium S.A had
received illegal State aid. Namely,  the complaints alleged that preferential  electricity
tariffs were granted to Aluminium S.A by the Greek state-owned  DEI S.A115 which
constituted unlawful State aid under 107(1)TFEU. Looking back in time, Aluminium
had signed since 1960 an agreement with DEI S.A, under which it purchased electricity
at preferential tariffs. This agreement would expire in March 2006, provided that one of
the contracting parties would give due notice two years in advance before expiration. In
February 2004, DEI S.A sent a notice to Aluminium S.A and it consequently terminated
applying  the  preferential  tariffs  since  the  end  of  March  2006.  Aluminium  S.A
challenged before the Greek National Courts the termination of the preferential tariffs.
Additionally,  it  asked for interim measures  in front of the Greek Courts the Athens
Single-bench Court of First  Instance,  and  in January 2007 it  gained the preferential
tariffs  again.  Before this  court's  decision,  from March 2006 until  January 2007, the
company  was  charged  electricity  by  DEI  S.A  at  normal  market  prices.  DEI  S.A
appealed the above interim measure and and in March 2008 the interim measure granted
in January 2007 was annulled by the Athens Multi-bench Court of First Instance. The
second decision  did  not  impose  any recovery  of  amounts  resulting  from the  lower
electricity pricing that was extended by the first court's decision. In June 2008, a new
agreement was signed between DEI S.A and Aluminium, imposing same pricing as for
any other industrial customer, valid from March 2008.
In January 2010, the Commission opened in-depth examination and decided to
initiate procedure laid down in Article108 (2) TFEU116. The Commission considered
that  it  had to  assess  as possible  prohibited  State  aid under  Article  107(1)TFEU  in
favour of  Aluminium (and before Aluminium of Greece): “the price difference between
the privileged price charged by DEI S.A to Aluminium of Greece until July 2007 (and
Aluminium  SA  as  the  successor  after  July  2007)  and   the  normal  industrial  price
115 Additionally,complaints  alleged  that  the  Public  state-owned  Gas  Corporation  (PPG)  paid  the
construction of  a  gas  pipeline belonging to  Aluminium of Greece.  This  measure  will  be not  further
analyzed in this paper.
116 D(2009) 10584 Final. Brussels, 27.1.2010  State aid C 2/2010 (ex NN62/2009) – Alleged state aid to
Aluminium of Greece S.A.- Greece Decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure 
37
charged during the same period of time to all  other  industrial  customers,  had to be
assessed” 117. 
Was it Unlawful aid under Article 107 (1) TFEU? The preferential pricing of the
electricity  granted  to  Aluminium  S.A  was  assessed  by  the  Commission  under  the
conditions of Article 107(1) TFEU. 
First, the Commission accepted that the preferential price granted in January 2007 to
Aluminium  S.A,  involved  State  resources  and  was  imputable  to  the  State.  The
prolongation  of  the  privilege  was granted  by the  National  Courts  (with  the  interim
measure in January 2007), which constituted a judicial authority and therefore a state
authority! On the other hand, DEI S.A which provided the electricity for a preferential
price was a 51% state  owned company!  Therefore,  the state resources criterion was
fulfilled. There could be no doubt that State resources were involved as the  DEI S.A
was de facto a State owned company. But as far as the fact that the prolongation of the
privilege  was  granted  by  the  Courts  as  a  State  authority  is concerned,  this  is  an
argument which raises many questions. Did the Courts really grant with the interim
measure a new State aid? Or did they just revive the previous situation, in this means
the “1960 agreement” between Aluminium S.A and DEI S.A?   
Secondly, the Commission sustained the fact that DEI S.A  refused to prolong the 1960
agreement, provided a good indication that the prolongation of the agreement provided
an advantage to Aluminium S.A which was the beneficiary, since  the preferential price
did not reflect the market price. 
Thirdly, the privileged pricing was applied only to Aluminium of Greece until July 2007
and Aluminium SA after that. Thus, the criterion of selectivity is indeed fulfilled. 
Fourth, the Commission argued that the privileged pricing was applied to Aluminium
S.A which was an undertaking active in a sector  whose products are  widely traded
117 IBID, see reference 115, par. 25-26. “The establishment privileges were granted to the company by
the establishment  agreement  of  1960 and  its  amendments  of  1966,  1969 and 1980,  therefore  before
Greece's accession to the European Economic Community in 1981. The Commission further notes that
the privileges were not amended in any regard since Greece's accession and that they did expire duly in
March  2006 or  even  before.  (26)  Therefore,  the  Commission  considers  that,  to  the  extent  that  they
constituted State aid,the establishment privileges referred to in the present subsection constituted existing
aid in the sense of article 1(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down
detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty”.  
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among Member States. Thus, the criterion of distortion of competition and affectation
of trade between Member States was held as fulfilled. 
The Commission considered that the measure of privileged electricity pricing
constituted State  aid in  favour of Aluminium of Greece and Aluminium S.A in the
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The Commission assessed after that the compatibility
with the internal market of the measure under Article 107(2),(3) TFEU and Secondary
law, but finally non justification was found and the Commission reached the decision
that  the  preferential  pricing  in  favour  of  Aluminium  S.A constituted  unlawful  and
incompatible State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU.
The final decision of the the Commission: New aid-Recovery of €17.4 million
plus interest! 
With  the  final  decision  the  Commission  concluded,  in  July  2011118 that  the
preferential  electricity  tariffs  granted  in  2007-2008  by  DEI  S.A  to  Aluminium  SA
constituted  NEW unlawful  and  incompatible  State  aid119! The  Commission  ordered
Greece to recover the aid  calculated around €17.4 million plus interest. 
The extension of the existing aid (Agreement 1960 Aluminium-DEI) had been
defined by the Commission as New aid120. Greece and Aluminium S.A alleged during
the examination process that for the period between the two court decisions (January
2007-March 2008) the preferential pricing consisted existing aid and not new aid and
therefore it  could not be assessed under the EU State Aid law121. It was a fact that the
National Court's decision of January 2007 did not amend the original agreement but
118 C  (2011)  4916  final.  Brussels,  13.7.2011  ON  THE  STATE  AID  No  C  2/2010  (ex  NN
62/2009)Implemented by Greece in favour of Aluminium of Greece SA.
119 The Commission came to the conclusion that the  tariff paid by Aluminion of Greece and Aluminon
S.A was lower than the standard tariff paid by other large industrial consumers. Greece did not submit
any convincing arguments permitting to conclude that this preferential tariff was a market tariff . The
lower pricing resulted in reduced revenue for DEI which was a company controlled by the State, therefore
State  resources  were  involved.  The  privileged  tariff  was  applied  in  a  selective  manner  as   only
Aluminium was granted this type of privilege. The beneficiary was active in sectors whose products are
widely traded among Member States and therefore the State aid caused  distortion of competition and
affectation of trade between Member States. Therefore it constituted unlawful aid!!! 
120 C-121/10 Commission v Council, par.58.The fact that that scheme is simply an extension of the
schemes  which  expired  on 31 December  2009,assuming that  be proved,  is  not  decisive  because  the
extension of an existing aid scheme creates  a new aid which is distinct from the scheme which was
extended (Case C-138/09 Todaro Nunziatina & C. [2010] ECR I-4561, paragraphs 46 and 47).
121 Existing aid in the sense of article 1(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999
laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty. 
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only extended the existing aid. The Commission  answered that under the case law it
was clear  that  “the extension  of  an existing  aid  constitutes  a  new aid  and must  be
notified”122.  The  Commission  added  that  this  was  also  the  case  when  a  terminated
existing  aid  was  reactivated.  After  this  decision,  one  reaches  the  conclusion  that
apparently the  Athens  Multi-bench  Court  of  First  Instance  had  to  notify  to  the
Commission the interim measure granted as new State aid under Article 108(3) TFEU,
despite the fact that it granted the privilege  for a limited duration and not  as a final
judgment would123!
The  annulment  procedure  before  the  General  Court:  A  success  story  for
Aluminium S.A! 
The Aluminium S.A brought an appeal124 before the General Court on 6 October
2011 against the final decision of the Commission125.  On the 8th October of 2014, the
General Court annulled the Commission's final decision126, on the ground that although
the case law has established that an amendment of an existing aid measure constitutes
122 C-70/72, Commission v Germany [1973] ECR 813, para 14 and judgement in C-197/99 P, Belgium
v Commission [2003] ECR I-8461, par. 109
123 M. Munoz de juan and M/ Kekelekis, “CaseT-542/11,Alouminion v European Commission”. EStAL
2/2015, Lexxion.pp.282
124 T-542/11,Alouminion AE Vs European Commission supported by Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou
AE (DEI).Aluminium puted forward the following grounds for annulment: “Infringement of Article 1 of
Regulation No 659/1999, and infringement of the rules concerning the allocation of competence between
the Commission and the national courts and the right to judicial protection. The Commission clearly erred
in its assessment of the facts, took account of factors that were clearly erroneous and made clear errors of
law in classifying the supposed aid as 'new'. The measure at issue was adopted under precisely the same
regime  as  the  supposed  existing  aid  and  the  reasoning  given  for  the  Commission's  view  is
defective;Infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU in asmuch as the Commission erred in finding there to be
an advantage, did not apply the private investor test and did not examine whether there are objective
commercial  grounds  justifying  the  contractual  tariff  of  1960;Infringement  of  Article  107(1)  TFEU
inasmuch as the Commission erred in finding that the aid is selective, notwithstanding the obligation of
the DEI (Dimosia Epikhirisi Ilektrismou (Public Power Corporation)) to set in a similar manner the tariffs
of similar categories of undertakings and in a different manner those of different categories to the extent
that they are different;Infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU inasmuch as the Commission erred in finding
that trade between Member States is distorted and affected, although the applicant does not obtain any
advantage compared with the other aluminium undertakings because of the uniformity of aluminium's
characteristics and because of the exchange-set price;Incorrect methodology in calculating the amount of
the supposed advantage;Infringement of the duty to state reasons;Infringement  of the principle of the
protection of legitimate expectations on account of the Commission's previous position that the DEI's
contractual tariff with the applicant did not constitute unlawful State aid, and of the applicant's rights of
defence”.
125C (2011) 4916 final. Brussels,  13.7.2011 ON THE STATE AID No C 2/2010 (ex NN 62/2009)
Implemented by Greece in favour of Aluminium of Greece SA.
126T-542/11 the  Judgment  8 October  2014Alouminion AE Vs European  Commission supported  by
Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou AE (DEI)
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new aid127, it has also been established under case law that the alteration on an existing
aid has to affect the substance of the initial scheme in order to constitute new aid128. The
General Court concluded that the decision of the Athens Multi-bench Court of First
Instance which ordered the interim measure of prolongation of the preferential pricing
had not modified the “agreement of 1960”, consequently the order did not constitute
new aid  and therefore unlawful aid. But the dispute between DEI S.A and Aluminium
had surely not come to an end! 
II. The Arbitration between DEI S.A and Aluminium S.A and Article 107(1)TFEU 
The discrepancy between the Greek PPC, DEI S.A  and Aluminium S.A in
relation  to  the  preferential  fixing  of  the  tariff's  for  electricity  supply  became
perdurable129.  There was need of a rapid and definitive settlement  of the dispute,  in
order to eliminate the reasons for prolonging the ongoing uncertainty, accumulation of
unreal debts from calculation methods130 that did  not meet an agreement or the law.
Aluminium S.A was convinced that DEI S.A had to grant a preferential tariff calculated
specifically for its industry which was by far the largest electricity consumer in Greece
as  its  consumption  exceeds  5%  of  the  total  power  consumption  in  Greece  and
127C-111/10 Commission Vs Council par. 58. C121/10 Commission V Council par. 59 Joined cases T-
127/99, T-29/99and T-148/99 Judgment  of 6 March 2002 in Diputaciσn Foral  de Αlava and Othersv
Commission. Par.175 
128 C-138/09 judgment in Todaro Nunziatina & C., par. 46  and 47 
129 In the course of the negotiations between DEI and Aluminion, on 4 August 2010, the two parties
signed  a  "Framework  Agreement",  concerning  the  electricity  tariff  as  well  as  the  settlement  of  the
outstanding  debts  of  Aluminium amounting  to  around  EUR 107 million.  Howbeit,  the  "Supply and
Settlement Agreement"  dated 5 October 2010, which would have laid down in detail  the contractual
relationship between the two parties with the aim of implementing the Framework Aluminium is by far
the largest electricity consumer in Greece (its consumption exceeds 5% of the total power consumption in
Greece and corresponds to 40% of the total consumption of high voltage consumers) and has an almost
constant consumption throughout the whole year. This settlement foresaw a write-off of EUR 25 million
by the  complainant  and  the  payment  of  the  remainder  (ca  EUR 82 million)  through  the  immediate
payment of EUR 20 million and the payment of the balance through monthly instalments bearing interest
at  the  rate  of  1-month  EURIBOR plus  1%.The  Agreement,  was  never  signed.  As such,  the  dispute
concerning the contractual relationship and the applicable tariff remained unresolved. 
130Decision 346/2012 RAE. Case Complain Nr.I-153367/16.03.12 Aluminion S.A Vs DEI S.A. Par.
52.The defendant(DEI), in contravention of the decisions of RAE 692/2011 and 798/2011 did not provide
the requesting  personalized invoice,  but  a  invoice  which  essentially  terms structure,  financial  result,
charges etc., is the tariff of A-150 which has never concerned Aluminion and the LARKO due to the
particular characteristics of these industries.The defendant's argument was that the price of 40.7EUR /
MWh is the lowest possible value that could be offered A 150+ 10%, as for  every electricity intensive
user. 
The Decision  346/2012 RAE which had set  an interim tariff  for  the electricity  supplied to
Aluminium for the time until the dispute between those two parties concerning the tariff was settled,
obliged it  to supply electricity to Aluminium below market prices  and, thereby,  to grant  State aid to
Aluminium. DEI sent a complaint to the European Commission  and claimed  that unlawful State aid  was
Granted by the Greek State to Alouminion with the above Decision. Finally, as the Arbitration Decision
fully  and  retroactively  replaced  the  interim  tariff  set  by  RAE,  the  Commission  considered  that  the
complaint in SA.34991 had become without object.  
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corresponds to 40% of the total consumption of high voltage consumers131. The parts
decided to accept arbitration under the auspices of the Greek Regulatory Authority for
Energy132.  This took place  in accordance with the basic principles  on power supply
tariffs approved by the European Commission, taking into account the underlying cost
of DEI S.A, and the consumption profile of Aluminium S.A. 
The Arbitral Tribunal appointed by the DEI S.A and Aluminium S.A rendered
the Arbitration Award Nr.1/2013 ("Award"). The Award had set the tariff  which DEI
S.A had to apply  supplying electricity to Aluminium for the period 1 July 2010 until 31
December  2013.  The  tariff  price  had  been  ultimately  determined  by  the  Award  to
36,6Euro/MWhour (40,7 Euro if obligatory charges of  4,11 Euro were included).  
As a matter of fact, the Arbitration Award was not to the liking of DEI S.A,
which decided to file  a complaint to the European Commission on the 23th December of
2013, claiming that it was forced by the Award to provide electricity to Aluminium S.A
at below-cost levels, which constituted prohibited State aid under Article 107 (1) TFEU.
When the final arbitration Award was rendered, DEI S.A claimed to the Commission
that  even  the  decision  to  submit  the  dispute  to  arbitration  by  itself  conferred  an
advantage for Aluminium! DEI S.A alleged that the preferential tariff provided by the
Award, offered an unfair and selective advantage over other industries which threatened
to distort competition and affect trade. Expressly, DEI S.A affirmed in its complaint that
the Award was a binding measure of the Greek State-according to Greek law, therefore
it constituted a support scheme imputable to the State. Moreover, DEI S.A argued, in a
nearly provocative manner, that  the tariff set by the Award involves State resources
131 C 38/A/04 (ex NN 58/04) and C 36/B/06 (ex NN 38/06).(2010/460/EC)Commission  Decision of 19
November  2009.  State  aid  measures  implemented  by  Italy  for  Alcoa  Trasformazioni.  Par.150  “The
Commission recalls that the method followed in Alumix addressed a very specific situation. In Alumix, the
tariff was allowed by ENEL, the then fully State-owned monopoly, in an electricity market which had yet
to be liberalised (66). In that situation, the Commission had to ascertain whether ENEL was selling at an
artificially low price or behaving like a rational  market economy operator.  Given the monopoly over
electricity generation and supply held by ENEL, there was no competitive market price to which the
Commission could refer to assess the existence of an advantage. Therefore, the Commission devised a
method to identify the lowest theoretical market price at which a rational supplier would be prepared to
sell to its ‘best customer’ (largest consumer with flat consumption profiles) in the specific circumstances
of market in Sardinia and Veneto: a rational supplier would seek to cover at least its marginal production
costs (baseload price), plus a fraction of its fixed costs.”
132 Article 37  of the Greek Law No. 4001/11. This Article provides that a permanent arbitration shall
be organised by RAE, in front of which disputes arising in the energy sector could be resolved, upon
agreement by the parties involved in a written arbitration agreement. 
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since it concerned the supply of electricity below the  market price by a State-owned
company-itself133! 
It is remarkable that DEI S.A decided to claim against the Award which was
rendered,  despite  the fact  that  the arbitration agreement  was signed in a  consensual
manner by both parties134. DEI S.A was not forced to sign the arbitration agreement. It
was crystal  clear  that obviously Arbitration constituted the best choice for DEI S.A
because  the  Greek  litigation   would  be  a  very  time-resuming  choice  granting  a
permanent decision after many years! Conclusively, as DEI S.A is the dominant player
in  the  Greek electricity  market  and Aluminium S.A would  not  have  the  alternative
choice of another electricity supplier, it would not be possible for DEI S.A to stop the
supplying of electricity until the Greek Courts would render a perpetual decision as this
would  be  an  abuse  of  its  dominant  position135.  Therefore  DEI  S.A  decided  that
Arbitration  would  be  the  most  rapid  procedure  (6  months)  in  order  to  render  a
decision136 and it signed the agreement to arbitration on the condition that Aluminium
S.A would make an immediate payment of a part of its outstanding debt and that it
would pay its monthly electricity invoices.
The  final  decision  of  the  European  Commission  -The  second  success  story  for
Aluminion! 
On the 25th of March 2015 the Commission came to its final decision about the
claims of DEI S.A in relation to the Arbitral Award137. The Commission examined first
if the decision to submit the dispute to arbitration granted in any manner an advantage
133 The 51% of Greek PPC,DEI shares  are owned by the Greek State. 
134 The Arbitral Tribunal consisted of experts in the field and its members were agreed upon by the
parties. While the arbitration was set in the context of the permanent arbitration of RAE under Article 37
of  Law  4001/2011,  under  the  applicable  regulations  the  arbitration  is  organised  by  RAE  only  in
procedural terms, as regards the required secretarial support. Thus, RAE did not have any influence on
the Arbitral Tribunal itself. 
135 Article 102 TFEU and/or Article 2 of the Greek Competition Act (Law 3959/2011, as amended)
136 Aluminium filed complaints to RAE, who ordered DEI to desist from terminating the supply of
electricity. In decision 15/2013 of 31 January 2013, the latest of a series of decisions on that matter, RAE
stated that the complainant could not terminate the electricity supply to Aluminium as long as the dispute
was subject to arbitration. In addition, after the Arbitration Decision and following negotiations on the
applicable tariff for the period after 31 December 2013, Aluminium filed a complaint to the Hellenic
Competition Authority alleging that  the complainant had abused its  dominant  position by seeking to
charge an excessive tariff and threatening to terminate Aluminium's electricity supply should said tariff
not be paid, thereby abusing Aluminium's alleged dependence upon the complainant. 
137 C(2015)1942 final. Brussels,25.3.2015. SA.38101 (2015/NN) (ex 2013/CP) – Greece Alleged State
aid to Aluminion S.A. in the form of electricity tariffs below cost following Arbitration Decision.
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to Aluminium S.A. Applying  the market economy vendor principle138, the Commission
considered  it  apropos  to  assess  whether  a  prudent  private  market  operator139,  in  a
position similar  to DEI S.A would have entered into such an arbitration agreement,
establishing similar parameters to be taken into account by the Arbitration Tribunal with
a view to updating and adapting the pricing terms included in the Supply and Settlement
Agreement  of  5  October  2010 for  a  certain  period  and resulting  in  the  Arbitration
Decision which in turn requires DEI S.A to apply such pricing terms during that period.
The comparison between DEI S.A and a hypothetical private operator's conduct had to
be made on the basis of available information and foreseeable developments at the time
when the relevant arbitration agreement was signed by the parties 140. The Commission
came  to  a  clear  decision  that  “the  arbitration  decision,  stating  ex  ante objective
parameters for determining the invoice in a way that would be acceptable to a prudent
private  market  investor,  ensured  that  no  advantage  was  granted  to  Aluminium”,
therefore there was no need for further examination under Article 107(1)TFEU. The
final decision of the Commission was momentous since it did not only reject the claim
of DEI and declare that the Award did not constitute prohibited State aid under Article
107(1) TFEU, but it additionally made a very crucial remark:  “the net tariff of 36.6
EUR/MWh that was finally determined by the Arbitration Decision is still  higher than
the  average  smelter  power  tariff  in  Europe, which  in  2013 was  reported  to  be  41
USD/MWh, equivalent to 30.87 EUR/MWh at 2013 exchange rates”141.  
138 This  principal  is  an  expression  of  the  more  general  market  economy  operator  principle
("MEOP").Applying that principle, it must be assessed whether a prudent private market operator, placed
in a similar situation as the complainant, would have acted in the same way as the complainant did. If this
is the case, then the complainant's counterpart cannot be said to have obtained an economic advantage
which was not available under normal market conditions. The comparison between the complainant's and
a  hypothetical  private  operator's  conduct  must  be  made  on  the  basis  of  available  information  and
foreseeable developments at the time when the relevant decision was made, here the decision to enter into
the arbitration agreement advantage on Aluminium  as alleged by the complainant.
139 C-290/07 P Commission Vs Scott, par.68 “First of all, as was observed by the Advocate General in
points 138 and 139 of his Opinion, in order to determine whether the sale of land by the public authorities
to a private individual  constitutes  State aid,  the Commission must apply the private investor  test,  to
determine whether the price paid by the presumed recipient of the aid corresponds to the selling price
which a private investor, operating in normal competitive conditions, would be likely to have fixed. As a
rule, the application of that test requires the Commission to make a complex economic assessment (see,
to that effect, Case C-56/93Belgium v Commission [1996] ECR-I 723, paragraphs 10 and 11, and Joined
Cases  C-328/99  and  C-399/00  Italy  and  SIM  2  Multimedia  v  Commission  [2003]  ECR  I-  4035,
paragraphs 38 and 39)”.
140 T-228/99 and T-233/99 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale Vs Commission,par.246
141 T-352/15 DEI S.A Vs Commission. The above decision has been  brought before the General Courts
by DEI, claiming that the decision has to be annulled, the result is pending.The application of DEI relies
on  six  pleas  in  law.  The  first  plea  in  law is  a  claim of  an  infringement  of  an  essential  procedural
requirement, in that the contested act does not satisfy the procedural requirements which are necessary for
the adoption of such a decision.The second plea in law is a claim of absence of a sufficient statement of
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The  Commission  decided  to  utter  in  its  decision  the  problem of  the  Greek
industries  which  are  intensive  electricity  users!  The  European  Commission  did  not
hesitate  to  characterize  the  offered  “preferential”  price  by  DEI  S.A  for  the  most
intensive user Aluminium S.A as the  higher than the average smelter power tariff in
Europe!  Coming to a conclusion, it is clear that Greece has to take initiatives, which
will be compatible under the EU State aid Law, in order to help the Greek industries to
reduce energy costs and remain competitive in the European Market! Otherwise under
the price and cost elements  that  are exhibited by the dominant  player  DEI S.A and
additional charges on the price per kWh, as the ETMEAR  no intensive industry can
survive and remain competitive  within the Greek territory. 
Conclusion  
It  is  clear  that  State  aid  in  the  energy  sector  can  undoubtedly  have
multidimensional  positive  effects,  but  only  if  it  is  applied  in  the  right  manner  and
according  to  the  law.  State  aid-support  schemes  can  fortify  the  environmental
protection,  the  climate  change,  energy  sustainability  and  the  competitiveness  of
industries as intensive electricity users, without  causing distortion of the competition
within  the  internal  Energy  market.  But  State  intervention  in  the  form of  State  aid
measures,  can  be  successful,  without  causing  distortion  of  competition,  only  if  it
constitutes a part of an organized and precise Energy policy of a Member State.     
reasons, contradiction and breach of the obligation to examine all relevant matters of fact and law with
respect to the finding that the Arbitration Agreement set ‘clear and objective parameters’ which ‘limited
the discretion of the arbitrators’ and had as a ‘logical consequence’ the finally determined electricity
tariff.The third plea in law is a claim of a manifest error of law in the interpretation and application of the
principle of the prudent private investor and of Article 107(1) and Article 108(2) TFEU, as concerns the
finding that the electricity tariff determined by the decision of the Arbitration Tribunal is ‘the logical
consequence of properly defined parameters in the Arbitration Agreement’.The fourth plea in law is a
claim of a manifest error of law in the interpretation and application of Articles  107 and 108 TFEU with
respect to the finding that the Commission did not have to engage in complex economic assessments and
a manifest error of law and a manifest error of assessment of the factual circumstances in so far as the
Commission failed to examine crucial  issues with respect  to  finding whether  or  not  there was State
Aid.The fifth plea in law is a claim of a manifest error of law in the application of Article107(1) and
Article108(2) TFEU, and a manifest error of assessment of the factual  circumstances as concerns the
application of the test of the prudent private market economy operator.The sixth plea in law is a claim of
a manifest error of law in the interpretation and application of Article107(1) TFEU, infringement of the
obligation to state sufficient reasons and a manifest error of assessment of the factual circumstances as
regards the decision by the Commission not to further investigate the complaint made by DEI in 2012
pursuant to Article108(2) TFEU, on the basis of the finding that that complaint ‘has become without
object’ following the delivery of Decision 1/2013 of the Arbitration Tribunal. The result is pending see
at:http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=T-352/15
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